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Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment: 
criminal responsibility for established medical practice? 
 
Ben White, Lindy Willmott, John Allen1 
 
The law recognises the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment even if 
this will lead to death.  Guardianship and other legislation also facilitates the making 
of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in certain 
circumstances.  Despite this apparent endorsement that such decisions can be lawful, 
doubts have been raised in Queensland about whether decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment would contravene the criminal law, and 
particularly the duty imposed by the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide the ‘necessaries 
of life’.  This article considers this tension in the law and examines various arguments 
that might allow for such decisions to be made lawfully.  It ultimately concludes, 
however, that criminal responsibility may still arise and so reform is needed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Australian criminal law traditionally distinguishes between euthanasia, which is 
unlawful in all jurisdictions,2 and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical 
treatment, which can be lawful in certain circumstances.  That decisions not to 
provide treatment may be lawful is reinforced, at least in relation to adults who lack 
capacity, by guardianship and other legislation enacted in all Australian States and 
Territories.3  This legislation facilitates the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, provided certain criteria are met, through mechanisms such as 
advance directives and substitute decision-making. 
 
Established medical practice is also premised on an assumption that decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment can be lawful in appropriate 
circumstances.  This is reflected in various medical policy statements,4 but also in the 
practice of medicine: it is estimated that over 35,000 deaths occur in Australia each 
year after decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults.5 
                                                 
1 Dr Ben White, LLB (Hons) (QUT), DPhil (Oxon), Associate Professor, Health Law Research Program, 
Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology;  Lindy Willmott, BCom, LLB (Hons) (UQ), LLM 
(Cantab), Professor, Health Law Research Program, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology; John Allen, LLB (Hons) (QIT), Barrister at Law, More Chambers, Brisbane. The authors 
would like to thank Michael May who provided helpful research assistance in the early stages of 
preparing this article. 
2 A Rothschild, ‘Capacity and medical self-determination in Australia’ (2007) 14 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 403, 408-409. 
3 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT); Powers of Attorney Act 2006 (ACT); 
Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW); Adult Guardianship Act (NT); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld); Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 
(SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 
(Vic); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA). 
4 For example, Australian Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in End of Life 
Care, (2007), para [10.7]. 
5 H Kuhse, et al, ‘End-of-life decisions in Australian medical practice’ (1997) 166 Medical Journal of 
Australia 191; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths (2007).  This conclusion is based on the 
percentage of Australian deaths following a decision to withhold or withdraw potentially life-
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Despite this widespread practice and the apparent legal recognition of its potential 
lawfulness, questions have been raised in Queensland about whether such decisions 
might nevertheless attract criminal responsibility. This issue has been the subject of 
quasi-judicial observation,6 academic commentary,7 and, most recently, review by the 
Queensland Law Reform Commission.8  This potential conflict in the law was also 
recently identified in Western Australia in Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter, 
although the issue there was resolved in part by relying on an excuse that is not 
available in Queensland.9  Despite the issue receiving some attention, the relevant 
literature to date has not examined these concerns comprehensively and it has also 
only considered criminal responsibility in relation to adults who lack capacity (and 
not competent adults for whom similar issues arise). 
 
This article seeks to fill that gap and examine in some detail whether these doubts as 
to the lawfulness of these decisions are well-founded and whether reform is needed.  
It begins by examining the legal framework that governs withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment for adults.10  This includes the situations of when an adult 
has capacity, and when he or she lacks it and so falls under the guardianship 
legislation.  The article then considers the relevant criminal law framework in which 
these decisions are made.  The outcome of reviewing these two areas of law is that a 
tension in legal principles exists.  On the one hand, life-sustaining treatment can be 
withheld or withdrawn in certain circumstances, but on the other hand, the criminal 
law imposes duties that may require it to be provided.  The article then explores ways 
in which this potential tension could be resolved through judicial interpretation. 
Finally, the need for reform is considered on the basis that uncertainty as to criminal 
responsibility for those involved in these decisions is undesirable.  
 
THE LAW PERMITS WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 
 
Competent adults 
 
A competent adult is entitled to refuse medical treatment, even if it is clearly in the 
person’s medical best interest, and even if it is needed to keep the person alive.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
prolonging treatment (28.6%) coupled with the number of adult deaths each year in Australia (the 
statistics only provide data for adults aged 20 and over). 
6 Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2, [55]-[63]; Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, [101]-[107]; Re SAJ [2007] 
QGAAT 62, [54]. 
7 L Willmott and B White, ‘Charting a course through difficult legislative waters: Tribunal decisions on 
life-sustaining measures’ (2005) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 441, 450-453; B White and L 
Willmott, Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions for Queensland (2005) 82-83 (available at 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/7093/). 
8 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Discussion 
Paper, WP 62 (2009) 328-331. 
9 [2009] WASC 229.  That excuse was s 259(2) of the Criminal Code (WA), which provides: 
A person is not criminally responsible for not administering or ceasing to administer, in good 
faith and with reasonable care and skill, surgical or medical treatment (including palliative 
care) if not administering or ceasing to administer the treatment is reasonable, having regard 
to the patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case. 
10 The legal framework that governs such decisions for children is different and is beyond the scope of 
this article: see J Tibballs, ‘The legal basis for ethical withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining 
medical treatment in children’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 244. 
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right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has long been recognised by the common law 
in the United Kingdom,11 and is well illustrated by the English decision of Re B 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment),12 a case involving a refusal of treatment by B, 
a tetraplegic who was being kept alive by a ventilator.  B’s request to have the 
ventilator removed was not followed by medical staff, and B brought an application 
seeking a declaration that she was being treated unlawfully. In concluding that the 
continued treatment of B was unlawful, Butler-Sloss P noted that ‘the right of the 
competent patient to request cessation of treatment must prevail over the natural 
desire of the medical and nursing profession to try to keep her alive’.13 The right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment has also been endorsed in other common law 
countries, including the United States,14 Canada15 and New Zealand.16  
 
Since the recent decision of the Western Australian Supreme Court in Brightwater 
Care Group v Rossiter,17 this must also be regarded as representing the common law 
in Australia (and therefore Queensland).18  Rossiter’s case involved multiple requests 
by a competent individual, a quadriplegic, for his medical treatment to cease.  Mr 
Rossiter was unable to take food or water orally, so received hydration and nutrition 
through a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube that had been inserted directly 
into his stomach.  Mr Rossiter wanted this treatment to stop, and both he and 
Brightwater Care Group (who was responsible for caring for Mr Rossiter) sought 
declarations about their respective rights and obligations.  Martin CJ considered the 
significant body of case law that exists in common law countries and concluded that 
Mr Rossiter, possessing the requisite capacity, was entitled to decide on the treatment 
that he wished to receive or refuse.  His Honour observed that a competent adult 
possessed a right to refuse medical treatment, ‘even if the failure to treat will result in 
the loss of the patient’s life’.19  Further, his Honour found that a ‘medical practitioner 
or a service provider who provides treatment contrary to the wishes of a mentally 
competent patient breaks the law by committing a trespass against the person of that 
patient’.20 
 
Adults with impaired capacity 
 
Even if an adult lacks decision-making capacity, a decision may be made to withhold 
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from that person in appropriate circumstances.  
                                                 
11 See, for example, Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; Re C (adult: 
refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 81; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
12 [2002] 2 All ER 449.   
13 Ibid 457. 
14 Cruzan v Director of Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990); Vacco v Quill, 521 US 
793 (1997). 
15 Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385; Malette v Schulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 
321. 
16 Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201; Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 235.  
See also Bill of Rights (NZ) s 11, although that provision refers only to refusing medical treatment 
generally. 
17 [2009] WASC 229. 
18 In Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574, Ambrose J seemed to accept the right of a competent adult to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment as part of the common law in Queensland (575-576), although these 
comments were obiter as this case instead dealt with an adult who was found to lack capacity.  See also 
Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761, [17] (Hunter J).  
19 [2009] WASC 229, [26]. 
20 Ibid [31]. 
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In Queensland, as in all Australian jurisdictions, the authority for decision-making in 
such a case stems from two alternative sources: the common law and legislation.  At 
common law, the Queensland Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to consent to, 
or authorise, the withholding or withdrawal of treatment.21  There is also power under 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld) to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment.   
 
Parens patriae jurisdiction 
 
The parens patriae jurisdiction of the Queensland Supreme Court is part of the 
Court’s inherent jurisdiction.  It allows the Court to consent to, or authorise, treatment 
for a person who lacks capacity to make such decisions, if the medical treatment is 
necessary for ‘the protection of the best interest of the health and welfare of the 
person the subject of its exercise’.22  This jurisdiction has also been invoked on a 
number of occasions to consider whether life-sustaining treatment should be 
continued or be withheld or withdrawn.23  Although to date no Australian Court has 
consented to, or authorised, the withholding or withdrawal of such treatment pursuant 
to its parens patriae jurisdiction,24 it was relied on to provide consent to the 
withdrawing of treatment in the New Zealand High Court decision of Re G.25  In that 
case, an application for consent to the withdrawal of life support was brought by the 
wife of a man who had suffered severe brain damage in a car accident.  In the 18 
months since the car accident, the man’s condition had not improved despite attempts 
at rehabilitation, and there were no prospects that he would improve.  If the same 
situation arose in Queensland, the Supreme Court would have the power to consent to, 
or authorise, the withholding or withdrawal of treatment.  
 
Guardianship legislation 
 
                                                 
21 The inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (including its parens patriae jurisdiction) is expressly 
preserved by s 109 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and s 240 of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld). 
22 Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549, 554 (O’Keefe J)  referring 
to the criterion as discussed by the High Court in Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Community Services v JWB (Marion’s case) (1991) 175 CLR 218, 240, 249, 252 (Mason CJ, Toohey, 
Dawson and Gaudron JJ), 270-273 (Brennan J), 295, 300 (Deane J), 316 (McHugh).  There are many 
other formulations of this criterion.  See, for example, In the Application of Herrington; Re King 
[2007] VSC 151, [22] (Williams J); Melo v Superintendent of Royal Darwin Hospital [2007] NTSC 71, 
[25] (Mildren J); Isaac Messiha (By His Tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 
1061, [25] (Howie J). 
23 Northridge v The Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549; In the Application of 
Herrington; Re King [2007] VSC 151; Melo v Superintendent of Royal Darwin Hospital [2007] NTSC 
71; Isaac Messiha (By His Tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061.   
24 In a number of cases, a decision had been made by the treating team to discontinue treatment and the 
parens patriae jurisdiction was invoked by family members seeking court direction to provide or 
continue treatment, or to seek further medical opinion.  See, for example, Isaac Messiha (By His Tutor 
Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061; In the Application of Herrington; Re King 
[2007] VSC 151 and Melo v Superintendent of Royal Darwin Hospital [2007] NTSC 71. Because in 
these cases, the Court was not satisfied that life-sustaining treatment was in the individual’s best 
interest, it declined to provide the relief sought (namely intervention to require treatment be given).  
There was therefore no need to make an order consenting to the withholding or withdrawal of treatment 
as such treatment was not being offered.   
25 [1997] 2 NZLR 201. 
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The other avenue for decision-making is through the legislative scheme established by 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld).26  This legislation facilitates decision-making for adults who lack capacity 
in relation to a range of matters, including ‘health care’.  This term is specifically 
defined to include withholding and withdrawing ‘life-sustaining measures’ in certain 
circumstances.27  Accordingly, the legislative framework providing for consent in 
relation to health care also includes consenting to withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment.  Where such a decision needs to be made, the way that the 
matter is determined depends on the decision-making framework that applies.  If the 
person who now lacks capacity had made an advance health directive refusing 
treatment, that document may determine the matter.28  If he or she has not made such 
a directive, the substituted decision-making framework in the legislation set out below 
will apply.   
 
(a) Advance health directives 
 
The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) facilitates an adult giving a direction in an 
advance health directive about particular treatment that the adult does not wish to 
receive at a later date when the adult is no longer able to decide for himself or 
herself.29  Such a directive may include instructions to refuse a life-sustaining 
measure.30 Although advance health directives are legally binding documents and 
must be followed by health professionals,31 a direction to withhold or withdraw a life-
sustaining measure cannot operate unless two or three conditions are met, depending 
on the circumstances.32  
 
                                                 
26 For a more detailed discussion of withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment under this 
statutory framework, see White and Willmott, Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions for 
Queensland above n 7. 
27 Withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure will be health care if ‘the commencement or 
continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good medical practice’: Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 2 s 5(2).  
The term ‘life-sustaining measure’ is defined as ‘health care intended to sustain or prolong life and that 
supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily functions that are temporarily or permanently 
incapable of independent operation’: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5A(1); Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 2 s 5A(1). 
28  There are some limitations set out in the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) which limit the 
circumstances in which an advance health directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will 
operate.  These limitations are considered below. 
29 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3.  Note that ‘advance health directive’ as defined in the 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) is a reference 
to a directive completed in accordance with the formal requirements of the Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld): Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(Qld) sch 4.  It does not include a reference to a common law advance directive, and these directives do 
not operate in Queensland: see B White and L Willmott, ‘Will You Do As I Ask? Recognition of 
Instructions about Health Care under Queensland’s Legislative Regime’ (2004) 4 Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77. 
30 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 35(2)(b). 
31 To be binding, an advance health directive must satisfy the formal requirements for completion as set 
out in the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld): ch 3 pt 4.  Note, however, that a health professional is 
excused from following the direction in an advance health directive in certain circumstances set out in 
the legislation: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
32 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2). 
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The first condition is that the adult’s prognosis must be sufficiently poor; the adult is 
required to fall within one of four categories.33  The second condition is that the 
advance health directive can apply only if the adult has no reasonable prospect of 
regaining the capacity needed to make decisions about his or her health.34  The third 
condition applies only if the direction in an advance health directive is that the adult 
not receive artificial nutrition and hydration. In these circumstances, the directive will 
only operate if the commencement or continuation of this treatment would be 
inconsistent with good medical practice.35 
 
If these two conditions (or three if the advance health directive relates to artificial 
nutrition and hydration) are satisfied, then the directive will provide a valid consent to 
withhold or withdraw treatment.  In this situation, there is no further requirement to 
consider tests such as the best interests of the adult or whether the treatment is the 
option that is the least restrictive of his or her rights.36  
 
(b) Substitute decision-maker 
 
If a person did not complete an advance health directive, then the decision needs to be 
made by someone or some authority on behalf of the person.  The legislation sets out 
a list of potential decision-makers, in order of priority, who may make the decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment:37  
 a guardian appointed by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘the 
Tribunal’)38 to make a decision,39 or the Tribunal itself, if it makes an order;40  
 an attorney appointed under an enduring power of attorney41 or under an 
advance health directive;42 or  
 a statutory health attorney.43    
                                                 
33 The adult must have either a terminal illness (or a condition that is incurable or irreversible) from 
which the adult is expected to die within a year; be in a persistent vegetative state; be permanently 
unconscious; or have an illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect that the 
adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining measures will not be needed: Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(a). 
34 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(c). 
35 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(b). 
36 In contrast, if consent is given by a substitute decision-maker, regard must be had to the principles 
set out in the legislation: see below. 
37 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 66. 
38  On 1 December 2009, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal assumed jurisdiction for guardianship 
matters and its predecessor, the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal, was abolished.  For a brief 
overview of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal and its establishment in the context of the 
guardianship jurisdiction, see Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s 
Guardianship Laws, Discussion Paper, WP 62 (2009) 7-10.  
39 The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a guardian to make decisions about ‘personal 
matters’ on behalf of the adult: Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 12.  Such decisions 
include those about ‘health care’: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 2(g); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 2 s 2(g).  For the definition of health care, see n 27 above. 
40 The Guardianship and Administration Tribunal has been involved in a number of decisions regarding 
the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining measures including Re AAC [2009] QGAAT 27, Re 
SAJ [2007] QGAAT 62, Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, Re TM [2002] 
QGAAT 1 and Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2.     
41 The legislation empowers an adult to appoint an attorney to make decisions about personal matters 
(which includes health matters) should the adult later lose his or her capacity to make the decision: 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 32. 
42 An adult can appoint an attorney under an advance health directive to make decisions about health 
matters: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 35(1)(c).   
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The legislation also guides how substitute decision-makers should make the decision 
about whether to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
measures. This guidance is in the form of ‘principles’,44 and those that are likely to be 
particularly relevant to this kind of decision include the following: the right of all 
adults to the same basic human rights, regardless of capacity;45 an adult’s right to 
respect for his or her human worth and dignity as an individual;46 the adult’s views 
and wishes, if they are known;47 the adult’s characteristics and needs;48 the option that 
is least restrictive of the adult’s rights;49 and what is in the adult’s best interests.50  
 
These principles were considered relevant by the Tribunal in the case of Re HG,51 a 
case involving a 58 year old man who had suffered a brain stem stroke, was unable to 
swallow and completely paralysed except for the ability to move his eyes up and 
down and blink.  After considering the above principles, the Tribunal consented to the 
withholding of artificial nutrition and withdrawal of artificial hydration.  
 
As a final point, it should be noted that the legislation contains a safeguard that 
applies in relation to these kinds of decisions.  The consent to withhold or withdraw 
the life-sustaining measure cannot operate unless the adult’s health provider 
reasonably considers that the commencement or continuation of the measure is 
inconsistent with good medical practice.52   
 
THE CRIMINAL LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 
 
Unlawful killing 
 
                                                                                                                                            
43 An adult’s statutory health attorney is the first person in the following list who is ‘readily available 
and culturally appropriate’ to make the decision: the spouse of the adult, provided that the relationship 
is close and continuing; the person’s carer, provided that the carer is eighteen years of age or over and 
is not a paid carer of the adult; or a close friend or relation of the person who must be eighteen years of 
age or over and must also not be a paid carer: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 63(1).  If no-one is 
readily available or culturally appropriate, the Adult Guardian (a statutory officer with responsibility 
for protecting the rights and interests of adults with impaired capacity) is the adult’s statutory health 
attorney: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 63(2). 
44 These principles are set out in Schedule 1 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). 
45 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
General Principle 2(1). 
46 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
General Principle 3. 
47 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
General Principle 7. 
48 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
General Principle 10. 
49 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
Health Care Principle 12(1)(a). 
50 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 
Health Care Principle 12(1)(b)(ii). 
51 [2006] QGAAT 26.  
52 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 66A.  ‘Good medical practice’ is defined in the 
legislation by reference to recognised medical standards, practices and procedures of the medical 
profession in Australia, as well as recognised ethical standards: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 
2 s 5B; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 2 s 5B. 
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The critical issue when determining criminal responsibility where a person has died is 
whether that person has been killed unlawfully. A person is deemed to have killed 
another if he or she causes the death of that other person,53 and the killing will be 
unlawful if this occurs without authorisation, justification or excuse.54 An unlawful 
killing is a crime55 that will be either murder (for example, if there is an intention to 
kill)56 or manslaughter,57 depending on the circumstances. 
 
There are two ways in which an unlawful killing can be established.58  The first is 
through Chapter 28 of the Criminal Code (Qld).  These provisions deal with acts or 
conduct through which a person causes another’s death in circumstances where the 
death is not an accident.  The second is through the provisions of Chapter 27 of the 
Code.  These provisions impose criminal responsibility on a person who fails to meet 
certain duties imposed by law.  Which of these two streams of law will apply to any 
given factual situation can be difficult to ascertain, but what is clear is that the Crown 
may only rely on one.59  In other words, on any given set of facts, the Crown is 
required to characterise their case as either one of causing death in circumstances not 
involving accident, or as one where the criminally culpable behaviour is a breach of 
duty imposed by Chapter 27. 
 
In the context of decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment, the provisions relevant 
to determining criminal responsibility are those contained in Chapter 27.  These 
decisions have generally been characterised as omissions (rather than acts) and so 
give rise to liability only if there is a duty to act.60  The limited consideration of the 
issue in Queensland also suggests that it is the provisions of Chapter 27, and 
particularly the duty imposed by section 285, that will be applicable.61  Accordingly, 
this examination of the criminal law will focus on Chapter 27. 
 
Criminal responsibility under Chapter 27  
 
The provisions in Chapter 27 of the Code impose a range of duties relating to the 
preservation of human life.  The purpose of these provisions is not to create 
independent offences, but instead to provide a basis for criminal responsibility for 
offences against the person such as manslaughter and murder.62  To secure a 
                                                 
53 Criminal Code (Qld) s 293.  When a person will be regarded as having caused another’s death is 
discussed below. 
54  Criminal Code (Qld) s 291. 
55 Criminal Code (Qld) s 300. 
56 Criminal Code (Qld) s 302. 
57 Criminal Code (Qld) s 303. 
58 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348.  For a further discussion of this issue, see B White, A Garwood-
Gowers and L Willmott, ‘Manslaughter under the Griffith Code: Rowing not so gently down two 
streams of law’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 217. 
59 White, Garwood-Gowers and Willmott, above n 58. 
60 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 866 (Lord Goff), 881-882 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
61 For example, see Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2, [55]-[63]; Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, [101]-[107]. 
This was also the view taken by Martin CJ in Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 in 
relation to the Criminal Code (WA), which is based on the same Griffith Code and so has broadly 
analogous provisions. 
62 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348, [13] (Thomas J).  Breaches of duty provisions can amount to murder, 
for example, if an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm can be shown: R v Macdonald and 
Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151 (breach of duty under s 285). 
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conviction in this context, the Crown must prove three elements beyond reasonable 
doubt: 
 A duty was owed; 
 That duty was breached; and 
 That breach of duty caused the death of another. 
 
The duty: section 285 
 
Although Chapter 27 contains a number of duty provisions, the one most relevant to 
this context is section 285.63  It provides: 
 
It is the duty of every person having charge of another who is unable by reason of age, sickness, 
unsoundness of mind, detention, or any other cause, to withdraw himself or herself from such charge, 
and who is unable to provide himself or herself with the necessaries of life, whether the charge is 
undertaken under a contract, or is imposed by law, or arises by reason of any act, whether lawful or 
unlawful, of the person who has such charge, to provide for that other person the necessaries of life; and 
the person is held to have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of the other person 
by reason of any omission to perform that duty. 
 
Therefore, the following elements need to be satisfied for Person A to be subject to a 
duty under section 285 in relation to Person B:  
 Person A has charge of Person B (whether the source of that charge arises from 
contract, is imposed by law, or arises from any act of Person A) 
 Person B is unable to withdraw himself or herself from that charge (for the 
reasons listed above in section 285 including ‘any other cause’) 
 Person B is not able to provide himself or herself with the necessaries of life. 
 
Although it is difficult to be categorical, given the wide variety of possible factual 
situations, it is clear why this provision has been identified as having potential 
application in the context of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. To 
illustrate, a common scenario at the end of life to which section 285 could apply is 
where a person who lacks capacity is being treated in hospital and is sufficiently 
unwell such that he or she requires medical treatment to stay alive.  In relation to the 
first element set out above, a treating doctor is likely to be regarded as having charge 
of the patient.  In relation to the second and third elements, it is unlikely that the 
patient will be able to withdraw himself or herself from that care or be able to provide 
the necessaries of life independently.  And in these circumstances, this treatment 
could be readily regarded as a necessary of life.64 
 
Breach of duty 
 
                                                 
63 Note also that the wording of s 290 of the Criminal Code (Qld) could be sufficiently broad to impose 
criminal responsibility in the context being considered.  That provision provides: 
When a person undertakes to do any act the omission to do which is or may be dangerous to 
human life or health, it is the person’s duty to do that act: and the person is held to have 
caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person by reason of any 
omission to perform that duty. 
Although note that a similar Canadian provision has been given a very confined interpretation, 
requiring a binding commitment before the duty is enlivened: R v Browne (1997) 116 CCC (3d) 183.  
Such an interpretation would limit the applicability of this duty provision in the context of medical 
practice. 
64 The scope of this duty and the meaning of terms such as ‘having charge of another’ and ‘necessaries 
of life’ are discussed below. 
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Having established that a duty is owed under section 285, the issue then becomes 
whether that duty has been breached.  Section 285 encompasses both negligent and 
deliberate breaches of the duty65 and, in the context of withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment, any breach will necessarily be a deliberate one. In 
considering whether section 285 has been breached, it has been held that the duty is 
‘for practical purposes in the same terms as that imposed by the common law’.66  In R 
v Stone and Dobinson, the English Court of Appeal stated the test for breach of duty 
as:67  
 
a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere 
inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be proved to have been indifferent to an 
obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk but to have determined 
nevertheless to run it. 
 
Causation 
 
If the duty imposed by section 285 is breached, then the result is that the person who 
had charge of another ‘is held to have caused any consequences which result to the 
life or health of the other person by reason of any omission to perform that duty.’68  
This phrase requires that a causal connection must be demonstrated between the acts 
or omissions that led to the breach of the duty and the death that resulted.  The 
relevant provision for causation is section 293, which defines ‘killing’: 
 
Except as hereinafter set forth, any person who causes the death of another, directly or indirectly, by any 
means whatever, is deemed to have killed that other person. 
 
The relevant test in Queensland is whether the act or conduct is a substantial or 
significant cause of death, or substantially contributed to the death.69  The breach of 
the duty imposed by section 285 need not be the sole cause of death.   
 
However, the issue of causation arises only if the accused owed a duty under section 
285 and then breached it. Without a breach of duty, a person is not deemed to have 
caused the consequences to the life or health of another. There is no killing without 
causation70 so the need for authorisation, justification or excuse71 does not arise.72 
 
CONFLICTING LEGAL PRINCIPLES  
 
The article so far has reviewed the law that governs withholding and withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment from adults and also the criminal law provisions that could 
                                                 
65 R v Young [1969] Qd R 417. 
66 Ibid 441 (Lucas J).  See also PE Smith, MJ Shanahan and S Ryan, Carter’s Criminal Law of 
Queensland, LexisNexis Online, [s285.10]. 
67 [1977] QB 354, 363. 
68 Criminal Code (Qld) s 285. 
69 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378, 398 (Brennan J), 411 (Deane and Dawson JJ), 423 
(Toohey and Gaudron JJ) and 441 (McHugh J).  This common law position has been adopted in 
Queensland in R v Lowrie and Ross [2000] 2 Qd R 529, R v Sherrington and Kuchler [2001] QCA 105 
and R v Carter [2003] QCA 515. 
70 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 293. 
71 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 291. 
72 Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508, 510 (McTiernan and Menzies JJ); R v Hodgetts and 
Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456, 461 (Thomas J). 
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potentially apply to decisions of this type. What emerges from this review is that the 
application of both areas of law appears to give rise to a conflict of legal principles.73   
 
On one hand, the law permits the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment in appropriate circumstances.  In relation to adults with capacity, it is a 
fundamental right that a person can refuse medical treatment, even if this will lead to 
that person’s death.  A similar situation arises in relation to adults with impaired 
capacity.  Legislation has been enacted which, subject to safeguards discussed above, 
enables an adult to refuse future treatment by way of an advance directive or permits a 
substitute decision-maker to refuse on the person’s behalf.  From this it is clear that 
the law recognises that these decisions can potentially be lawful. 
 
However, on the other hand, the criminal law imposes sanctions on those who fail to 
provide the necessaries of life to others who are in their charge.  A breach of section 
285 of the Criminal Code (Qld) can result in criminal responsibility for the death.  It 
would be obviously undesirable if a doctor or others, acting lawfully in respecting a 
refusal of medical treatment as set out above, found themselves the subject of criminal 
liability. 
 
The situation is further complicated by provisions in the Criminal Code (Qld) and the 
guardianship legislation.  One such provision is section 284 of the Code, which 
provides: 
 
Consent by a person to the causing of the person's own death does not affect the criminal 
responsibility of any person by whom such death is caused. 
 
The difficulty posed by this provision is that the basis upon which these decisions 
may be lawful, at least in relation to adults who lack capacity, is consent.  As noted 
above, the guardianship legislation treats decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, either in an advance health directive or by a substitute decision-
maker, as consent.  If consent is specified to be insufficient to displace criminal 
responsibility, then the conflict between these legal principles becomes even more 
stark.  This position becomes further entrenched when it is noted that both the Powers 
of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) 
specifically provide that nothing in these Acts affects section 284 (or Chapter 28) of 
the Criminal Code (Qld).74  Those provisions also state that nothing in these Acts 
authorises, justifies or excuses the killing of a person.75 
 
What the above analysis points to is, at least, an apparent conflict of legal principles.  
Is there room, however, for the criminal law to accommodate decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment that are otherwise regarded as being lawful?   
 
HOW MIGHT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY BE AVOIDED 
 
                                                 
73 For other discussions of this conflict, see also Willmott and White, ‘Charting a course through 
difficult legislative waters: Tribunal decisions on life-sustaining measures’ above n 7; White and 
Willmott, Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions for Queensland above n 7. 
74 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 37(b); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 
238(b).  
75 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 37(a); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 
238(a).  These arguments about s 284 of the Code are noted in Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, [106]-[107]. 
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This section of the article considers the principal arguments that could be mounted as 
to why criminal responsibility might not be imposed in relation to decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.  It considers first the situation of 
competent adults and examines the following arguments: 
 No duty is owed under section 285 of the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide or 
continue treatment and thus no basis for criminal liability exists; 
 Even if a duty is owed under section 285 and is breached, the failure to provide or 
continue treatment is not the cause of death and so criminal responsibility does not 
arise; and 
 Even if criminal responsibility is prima facie established under section 285, there 
is a ‘lawful excuse’ for the killing. 
 
The article then considers the position of adults who lack capacity and the extent to 
which these arguments are applicable in that context.   
 
Competent adults 
 
No duty is owed 
 
There are three potential limbs to the argument that a doctor who is withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment might not owe a duty to provide the necessaries 
of life pursuant to section 285: 
 The treating doctor (or others) do not have charge of a patient or that the patient is 
able to withdraw from that charge; 
 The life-sustaining treatment is not a ‘necessary of life’; and 
 The duty in section 285 does not arise where a patient refuses medical treatment. 
 
(a) Not have charge of a person 
 
The argument that is considered here is that criminal responsibility for withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment does not arise because the patient is not under 
the charge of another, or that the patient is able to withdraw from that charge.  Section 
285 of the Criminal Code (Qld) imposes a duty on a person who has  
 
charge of another who is unable by reason of age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, detention, 
or any other cause, to withdraw himself or herself from such charge … whether the charge is 
undertaken under a contract, or is imposed by law, or arises by reason of any act, whether 
lawful or unlawful, of the person who has such charge … 
 
The concept of having charge of another was considered in Brightwater Care Group 
(Inc) v Rossiter.76  As noted above, Mr Rossiter was a quadriplegic who was totally 
dependent on others for care, and this care was generally provided by the Brightwater 
facility.  He did, however, have capacity to decide to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  
In concluding that Mr Rossiter’s refusal of treatment needed to respected, Martin CJ 
had cause to consider a provision of the Criminal Code (WA) analogous to section 
                                                 
76 [2009] WASC 229. 
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285.77  His Honour concluded that Mr Rossiter was not in Brightwater’s charge78 and 
stated:79 
 
… the reference to a person ‘having charge of another’ is a reference to a person who, by 
reason of one or more of the various disabilities identified in the section, lacks the capacity to 
direct or control their own destiny and is therefore dependent upon the person ‘having charge’ 
of them. 
 
Mr Rossiter lacks the physical capacity to control his own destiny, but enjoys the mental 
capacity to make informed and insightful decisions in respect of his future treatment.  In that 
latter respect he is not relevantly within ‘the charge’ of Brightwater. 
 
A preliminary point is to clarify the meaning of Martin CJ’s comments.  It is unclear 
whether His Honour considered that simply having the requisite mental capacity to 
make the relevant decisions was sufficient for Mr Rossiter not to be in the charge of 
Brightwater, or whether there was also a requirement to have an ability to give effect 
to the exercise of that capacity.  At one point, Martin CJ seems to suggest that an 
ability to exercise ‘mental capacity to make informed and insightful decisions’80 
would be sufficient to mean that Mr Rossiter was not in Brightwater’s charge, but an 
earlier passage makes reference to the provision being intended to apply where a 
‘person lacks the capacity to control or direct their own destiny and is therefore 
dependent’.81  It is submitted that that the better view of Martin CJ’s comments is to 
require both mental capacity and an ability to give effect to the exercise of that 
capacity. To argue that once a person has capacity, they are can no longer be in charge 
of a treating doctor or others fails to recognise the reality of almost absolute control 
that potentially can be exercised over a person with profound physical disabilities. 
 
This proposition may be tested by varying the facts in Rossiter so that Mr Rossiter 
died because Brightwater had decided, without the consent or agreement of Mr 
Rossiter, not to provide the artificial nutrition and hydration he needed to stay alive.  
It would seem odd if criminal responsibility was precluded in this situation simply 
because Mr Rossiter had capacity and so Brightwater could not be regarded as having 
charge of him.   
 
What flows from this analysis is that it is possible for an adult to have capacity and 
still be in the charge of another for the purposes of section 285.  Accordingly, while it 
is accepted that criminal liability might not arise under this provision for some 
competent adults from whom life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn, 
because they are not in the charge of another, such an approach does not provide a 
comprehensive solution to the concerns about criminal responsibility identified above.  
 
A similar point can be made in relation to the requirement in section 285 that the 
person is unable to withdraw from the charge.  In Rossiter, Martin CJ considered, as a 
further ground in addition to the issue of ‘having charge of another’, that if Mr 
Rossiter had the financial capacity to discharge himself from Brightwater and arrange 
                                                 
77 Criminal Code (WA) s 262. 
78 [2009] WASC 229, [42]. 
79 Ibid [39]-[40]. 
80 Ibid [40]. 
81  Ibid [39]. 
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for his care to be provided by another service provider, then he would not be a person 
who is ‘unable to withdraw himself’ from Brightwater’s charge.82 
 
While withdrawing from such a charge may be open to some competent adults, it will 
not be for others.  To explore further the example given by Martin CJ, some adults 
may lack the financial resources needed to make such a decision and be dependent on 
existing care arrangements.  Another situation in which a person may be unable to 
withdraw from a charge is where they lack the ability to give effect to the exercise of 
their capacity as discussed above.  This could occur, for example, where an adult with 
profound physical disabilities has no contact with people other than his or her service 
providers.  Although having capacity, he or she would not be in a position to 
withdraw from that care unless the service providers agreed to facilitate that decision.   
Accordingly, the argument that criminal responsibility need not arise because 
competent adults can withdraw from any charge that might exist are not of universal 
application and so the concerns above remain. 
 
(b) Not a necessary of life 
 
It is clear that medical treatment is capable of being a ‘necessary of life’.83  However, 
it has been argued that life-sustaining treatment may not always be regarded as such 
and so criminal responsibility for not providing or continuing it may not always arise.  
Although there have been suggestions that the nature of the treatment (for example, 
whether it involves ‘extraordinary measures’) should govern whether it is considered 
a necessary of life,84 it is submitted that the preferable approach is to determine this 
question having regard to the particular circumstances of each case.85  This was the 
approach taken by Thomas J in Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General86 
where His Honour was considering the use of ventilator for a man who was regarded 
as ‘beyond recovery’:87 
 
To my mind, however, there is no absolute answer; the answer in each case must depend upon 
the facts.  Thus, the provision of artificial respiration may be regarded as a necessary of life 
where it is required to prevent, cure or alleviate a disease that endangers the health or life of a 
patient.  If, however, the patient is surviving only by virtue of the mechanical means which 
induces heartbeat and breathing and is beyond recovery, I do not consider that the provision of 
a ventilator can properly be construed as a necessary of life.   
 
The above quote suggests a broad dichotomy between life-sustaining treatment that 
might be regarded as therapeutic and so capable of bringing benefit to a patient, and 
that which might be described as futile.  In the former case, life-sustaining treatment 
is likely to be considered a necessary of life, but perhaps not in the latter.  It is 
accepted that this broad dichotomy between therapeutic and futile treatment is 
imprecise and that these terms are capable of different meanings, but for the purpose 
of this article it is sufficient to establish that there will be times when life-sustaining 
treatment is a necessary of life, and times when it will not be. 
                                                 
82  Ibid [41]. 
83 R v Macdonald and Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; R v Nielsen [2001] QCA 85, [3] (Williams JA). 
84 See, for example, the discussion of this view in Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2, [56]-[59]. 
85 Willmott and White, ‘Charting a course through difficult legislative waters: Tribunal decisions on 
life-sustaining measures’ above n 7, 452. 
86 [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
87 Ibid 249-250. 
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In terms of the concerns identified in relation to criminal responsibility, this approach 
would be acceptable if that dichotomy in the criminal law described above aligned 
with the law that governs the rights of competent adults to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.  Unfortunately, it does not.  A competent adult may refuse life-sustaining 
treatment that is very clearly needed to produce therapeutic benefits and so would not 
be regarded as futile.  Two cases that illustrate this were discussed above: Re B 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)88 and Rossiter.  In both cases, the adults 
concerned decided they no longer wished to receive treatment (artificial ventilation 
and artificial nutrition and hydration respectively) even though it would bring medical 
benefits.  Accordingly, it is likely that such treatment would be characterised as 
‘necessaries of life’ and so fall within the scope of section 285.  Again, while such an 
approach may resolve concerns about inappropriate criminal responsibility in some 
cases, in others it will not. 
 
(c) No duty where treatment refused 
 
A final argument as to why no duty would be owed under section 285 is that the duty 
cannot arise in relation to treatment that a patient refuses.  The starting point for an 
examination of this issue is the decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.89  In that 
case, when considering the intersection between the right to refuse treatment and the 
criminal law, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated:90 
 
A mentally competent patient can at any time put an end to life support systems by refusing 
his consent to their continuation.  In the ordinary case of murder by positive act of 
commission, the consent of the victim is no defence.  But where the charge is one of murder 
by omission to do an act and the act omitted could only be done with the consent of the 
patient, refusal by the patient of consent to the doing of such act does, indirectly, provide a 
defence to the charge of murder.  The doctor cannot owe to the patient any duty to maintain 
his life where that life can only be sustained by intrusive medical care to which the patient will 
not consent. 
 
While that approach appears to be a reasonable one, and in particular it has the benefit 
of maintaining coherence in both areas of law, whether it could be adopted in 
Queensland is complicated by its Criminal Code.  This tension in the law needs to be 
resolved having regard to the provisions of the Code and reference to the common law 
is problematic.91  How then could this issue be resolved in Queensland? 
 
One option would be to adopt the reasoning employed in Rossiter on this issue, 
because Western Australia has a Criminal Code similar to Queensland’s.  In that case, 
Martin CJ noted that for the analogous provision in that State to impose a duty to 
provide treatment contrary to a patient’s refusal would be a ‘drastic alteration’ of the 
common law position.92  His Honour continued:93 
 
                                                 
88 [2002] 2 All ER 449.   
89 [1993] AC 789. 
90 Ibid 882-883. 
91 See Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107; R v Martyr [1962] Qd R 398; Ward v R 
[1972] WAR 36; Stuart v The Queen (1974) 134 CLR 426, 437 (Gibbs J); Mellifont v Attorney-General 
(Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289, 309 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
92 [2009] WASC 229, [38]. 
93 Ibid. 
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Given the strength of the principle of self-determination to which I have referred, it seems 
inherently unlikely that the Parliament intended such a drastic change when enacting s 262 in 
its current form, and I would only conclude that it was Parliament's intention to make such a 
drastic change if compelled to that conclusion by the clear and unequivocal language of the 
section. It seems to me that there is no such clear and unequivocal language in that section and 
that therefore the first answer to the proposition that s 262 might apply to the circumstances of 
this case is that the section should not be read as extending to the imposition of duties which 
would be unlawful at common law. 
 
While this approach leads to a desirable and sensible outcome, it is submitted that this 
line of reasoning is not entirely compelling.  In particular, it is unclear how limiting 
the plain words of the Criminal Code (WA) by reference to the common law is 
permitted as a matter of statutory interpretation.94 
 
A second option would be to apply the reasoning employed in Bland to the Criminal 
Code (Qld); that is, where a patient refuses treatment for which consent is required, no 
duty to provide that treatment can arise.  The starting point in applying this reasoning 
is to determine whether the provision of treatment requires consent in these 
circumstances.  Section 245 of the Criminal Code (Qld) defines ‘assault’ in terms that 
would encompass the provision of life-sustaining treatment without the consent of the 
patient.  Section 246(1) of the Code provides that an assault is unlawful and 
constitutes an offence.  Therefore treating a person without consent would, so far as 
the criminal law is concerned, prima facie amount to an assault under section 246 of 
the Code.  However, that provision also states that an assault will not be unlawful if it 
‘is authorised or justified or excused by law.’  It could be argued that if there is a duty 
to provide life-sustaining treatment under section 285, that could constitute an 
excuse95 and so the provision of life-sustaining treatment without consent may not be 
unlawful.  If this is accepted, then it cannot be argued that consent is required to 
provide the treatment and so the Bland argument may not apply under the Code. 
 
It is also noted that the position may be further complication by section 284; this 
provision states that consenting to one’s death does not affect criminal 
responsibility.96  If a refusal of life-sustaining treatment is characterised as consenting 
to one’s death, then the effect of this provision could be that the refusal will not be 
sufficient to displace the duty imposed by section 285 as it will not alter criminal 
responsibility.  There are, however, arguments that section 284 may not apply.  The 
most compelling is that section 284 applies only in relation to deaths that have been 
caused by another, and unless there is a duty owed in accordance with section 285 and 
it is breached, there can be no causation of death.  So section 284 does not arise for 
consideration until after causation has been established, and that can only occur after 
breach of section 285 has been shown, so section 284 cannot then act to require the 
section 285 duty to be imposed.  A second argument draws on the discussion of Bland 
above that the prohibition on consenting to one’s death applies only to acts and not 
                                                 
94 See above n 91. 
95 This argument is put forward on the basis of an analogy with State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 
Qd R 454.  In that case, Chesterman J considered the lawfulness of an operation on conjoined twins 
that was needed to save the life of one twin but would lead to the death of the other.  His Honour 
concluded that section 286 of the Criminal Code (Qld), a duty provision which imposed care 
obligations in relation to children under 16, compelled the operation. This amounted to an authorisation 
for the act and so the killing of the weaker twin would therefore not be unlawful: 459.  See also State of 
Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562. 
96 This section is set out above when introducing the relevant criminal law provisions. 
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omissions.  This is not persuasive though because the wording of section 284 is not 
limited in that way.   
 
The argument that the duty under section 285 does not arise in relation to medical 
treatment that has been refused presents a plausible basis on which to conclude that 
criminal responsibility may not arise in these circumstances. A significant advantage 
of such an approach is that, unlike the arguments considered previously, it is not 
limited in its application to particular fact situations.  As noted above, however, the 
basis for accepting this argument against criminal responsibility is uncertain. 
 
Breach of duty is not the cause of death 
 
Section 285 requires that a causal connection be demonstrated between the breach of 
the duty it imposes and the relevant death.  This permits a further argument to be 
made against criminal responsibility in this context, namely, that even if the duty to 
impose the necessaries of life was breached, the treating doctor or others should not 
be regarded as having caused the patient’s death.  MacFarlane quotes Galbally in this 
regard:97 
 
The medical practitioner’s action in withdrawing artificial life promulgation machinery is not 
the real cause of death or even a substantial cause of death.  His action merely allows the 
existing fatal condition to operate naturally.  He does not substitute for it a new and different 
cause of death. 
 
Although this argument might appear superficially attractive, there have been some 
compelling critiques of such an approach. For example, in Auckland,98 the argument 
was raised that it was not the withdrawal of artificial ventilation that would lead to the 
patient’s death; rather it was the underlying condition: his Guillain-Barré syndrome.  
Thomas J rejected this approach because it was not capable of being sustained in other 
situations involving life-sustaining treatment and gave the example of a polio victim 
who wished to receive such treatment.  It would not be appropriate in that situation to 
conclude that withholding or withdrawing treatment would not cause the patient’s 
death and so the lack of causation argument could not be sustained.99  Although His 
Honour did later conclude that withdrawing the treatment was not the cause of death, 
this was only by operation of law because there was either no duty to provide it or 
because there was lawful excuse to withdraw treatment.100 
 
The lack of causation argument was also critiqued by Lord Mustill in Bland,101 where 
His Lordship was prompted to say that such an approach ‘seems to me to require not 
manipulation of the law so much as its application in an entirely new and illogical 
                                                 
97 P MacFarlane, Health Law in Australia and New Zealand: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2000), 
221, citing F Galbally, Death by Statute (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 339.  MacFarlane also cites 
R v Kinash [1982] Qd R 648 in support of this proposition although that case arose in a different 
context, namely the potential impact of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on the criminal 
responsibility of a man who seriously assaulted a woman where that woman later died from the injuries 
sustained. 
98 [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
99 [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 248-249. 
100 [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 254. 
101 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. Compare Lords Goff (867) and Browne-Wilkinson 
(882). 
 18
way’.102  In a similar vein to Thomas J in Auckland, Lord Mustill considered that such 
an approach was flawed because the conclusion as to whether the death was caused by 
withholding or withdrawing the treatment could vary depending on judgments as to 
whether the omission was regarded as lawful or not.  Such an approach is inconsistent 
with the general principles of criminal law.103 
 
In addition to the logical difficulties with the argument that withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment does not cause death, such an approach also sits 
awkwardly with section 296 of the Code.  That provision states: 
 
A person who does any act or makes any omission which hastens the death of another person 
who, when the act is done or the omission is made, is labouring under some disorder or 
disease arising from another cause, is deemed to have killed that other person. 
 
To argue that a death was caused by an underlying illness and not by withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (assuming it can be shown that this omission 
hastened the time of death) seems inconsistent with the terms of section 296.  It is 
suggested that for these reasons, the lack of causation argument is unlikely to be 
accepted in Queensland. 
 
Authorised, justified or excused by law 
 
A final possible argument in support of the position that criminal responsibility should 
not arise is that any killing of a patient is ‘authorised or justified or excused by 
law’.104  One potential basis for exculpation is ‘good medical practice’. In 
Auckland,105 it was held that the doctors were legally justified in withdrawing 
artificial ventilation and would not be acting without ‘lawful excuse’ if that decision 
was taken in accordance with good medical practice.  Thomas J stated:106 
 
In my view, doctors have a lawful excuse to discontinue ventilation when there is no medical 
justification for continuing that form of medical assistance.  To require the administration of a 
life-support system when such a system has no further medical function or purpose and serves 
only to defer the death of a patient is to confound the purpose of medicine.  In such 
circumstances, the continuation of the artificial ventilation may be lawful, but that does not 
make it unlawful to discontinue it if the discontinuance accords with good medical practice.  
 
It is argued that it is most unlikely that a similar approach would be adopted in 
Queensland.  To recognise a lawful excuse that does not arise from the terms of the 
Criminal Code (Qld) or even from some other piece of legislation, but rather from 
imprecise notions of what the medical profession regards as ‘good medical practice’, 
would be contrary to clear authorities as to how a code is to be interpreted.107 
 
Adults with impaired capacity 
 
Guardianship legislation 
 
                                                 
102 Ibid 895. 
103  Ibid 895-896. 
104 Criminal Code (Qld) s 291. 
105 [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
106 Ibid 250. 
107 See above n 91. 
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Having examined potential criminal responsibility for refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment by competent adults, the position of adults with impaired capacity is now 
considered.  In relation to decisions made pursuant to the guardianship legislation, the 
starting point is section 80 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), 
which provides:  
 
A person carrying out health care of an adult that is authorised by this or another Act is not 
liable for an act or omission to any greater extent than if the act or omission happened with the 
adult’s consent and the adult had capacity to consent. 
 
Section 101 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) is in similar terms in relation to 
decisions made under that Act.  The effect of these provisions is that a person 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in accordance with the 
guardianship legislation will not be liable to any greater extent than if it had been the 
patient himself or herself who made the decision while competent.  The significance 
of this for the purposes of this article is that if any of the above arguments are 
successful to avoid criminal responsibility for withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from a competent adult, then these provisions will also mean that 
liability does not arise in the case of such decisions made under the guardianship 
legislation for adults who lack capacity.   
 
Despite these provisions, it is argued that the position as it relates to competent adults 
could be varied slightly as it applies to adults with impaired capacity.  This is because 
of the possibility that greater protection may be available under the guardianship 
legislation.  This is permitted by terms of section 80 of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) and section 101 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) as they only require that there will be no less protection provided under the 
guardianship legislation than in relation to competent adults.   
 
There are two arguments that can be put forward in this regard and both relate to the 
proposition advanced earlier that there is no duty to provide treatment under section 
285 in relation to treatment that has been refused by a patient.  The first argument 
extends the line of reasoning outlined in Rossiter that the Criminal Code (Qld) should 
be interpreted in light of the common law right to refuse treatment.  Although there 
are problems with such an approach, perhaps this argument could be more strongly 
put given that, in the context of the guardianship legislation, it is not merely the 
common law that supports this right, but rather a legislative regime specifically 
designed to facilitate such decisions. 
 
The second argument as to why no duty might arise where treatment is refused draws 
on the reasoning above from the Bland decision.  It was argued that the provision 
criminalising treatment without consent (section 246 of the Criminal Code (Qld)) was 
subject to justification, authorisation or excuse, and that this could be provided by the 
duty in section 285.  Accordingly, the basic premise necessary for the argument to 
succeed – that the treatment could not be provided without consent – might not be 
present.  However, further support for the Bland approach in the guardianship context 
might be found by pointing to section 79 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld).  The relevant effect of that provision in this context is that it makes it an 
offence to provide health care (which includes making it an offence to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment) without consent except in certain circumstances.  
The provision is not qualified to be subject to justification, authorisation or excuse 
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like section 246 of the Code, and the exceptions in section 79 as to when consent is 
not needed do not seem apposite to include that the treatment must be given pursuant 
to the duty imposed by section 285.108  This could lend weight to the view that 
because the treatment cannot be provided without consent due to section 79, the duty 
to provide the necessaries of life would not arise because such treatment cannot be 
lawfully given. 
 
A final comment in relation to the position of adults with impaired capacity is to note 
that the guardianship legislation itself cannot be relied upon to provide an 
authorisation, justification or excuse for a killing.  This basis for avoiding criminal 
responsibility is precluded because section 238 of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) and section 37 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) expressly say that nothing in these Acts can have that effect.109 
 
Despite the subtle variations discussed above, the position so far as criminal 
responsibility for decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from 
adults with impaired capacity remains broadly the same as that set out for competent 
adults and so remains unsatisfactory.  It is accepted, however, that concerns about 
such liability are less likely to arise in practice in relation to decisions made under 
this legislation.  This is because there is less scope for guardianship decisions to be 
made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that is not futile in the sense 
discussed above.  Section 66A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(Qld) imposes a good medical practice safeguard for substitute decision-making and 
section 36(2) of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) also limits the circumstances 
when advance health directives can operate. It is suggested that if these legislative 
requirements are met, it will generally be the case that relevant treatment in the 
circumstances will be futile and so not be regarded as a ‘necessary of life’.  
Accordingly, as discussed above no duty to provide such treatment under section 285 
will arise. 
 
Parens patriae jurisdiction 
 
As noted above, the Queensland Supreme Court has the power in its parens patriae 
jurisdiction to consent to, or authorise, withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment.  The relevant test applied is ‘the protection of the best interest of the health 
and welfare of the person the subject of its exercise’.110  In terms of the issue of 
whether criminal responsibility could potentially arise for decisions made in this 
forum, problems remain.  On the one hand, liability could be rejected on the basis that 
the court’s consent on behalf of the patient is sufficient for the decision to be 
lawful.111  However, if the above analysis as to the effect of a refusal by a competent 
                                                 
108 The most applicable exception is s 79(1)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) 
which provides: ‘this or another Act provides the health care may be carried out without consent’.  
Section 285 of the Code is not framed as permitting the carrying out health care without consent; rather 
it imposes a duty on one person to provide necessaries of life to another based on a relationship of 
dependency. 
109 It is also noted that the other clause in these provisions, namely that nothing in the Acts affects 
section 284 or Chapter 28 of the Criminal Code (Qld), does not give rise to separate issues in this 
context.  The inapplicability of section 284 was discussed above as was that liability in these cases will 
be resolved according to Chapter 27 of the Code and not Chapter 28. 
110 See above n 22.  
111 Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201, 212 (Fraser J). 
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adult is accepted, it is suggested that there are reasonable doubts as to whether court 
authorisation or consent will be sufficient in itself to avoid criminal responsibility.   
 
An alternative is that the court can consider the relevant criminal law framework and 
determine whether the decision will be lawful or not.112  Again, such an approach 
would draw on the propositions considered above for competent adults that are 
relevant to this question: the arguments about necessaries of life, causation and lawful 
excuse.  To the extent that it has been identified that those approaches remain an 
unsatisfactory basis for determining criminal responsibility, those concerns arise here 
as well. 
 
It should be conceded though, as for decisions under the guardianship legislation, that 
the nature of the criterion for these decisions means that the courts are only likely to 
allow the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in circumstances where its provision 
would be futile.  In those circumstances, the ‘necessaries of life’ argument is likely to 
preclude criminal responsibility. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
What emerges from the foregoing analysis is that the law that recognises the right to 
refuse treatment does not sit comfortably with the criminal law, and particularly 
section 285 of the Criminal Code (Qld).  There are arguments, as noted above, that 
could address concerns about criminal responsibility for withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment, but two problems were identified.  
 
The first is that while some arguments might seem effective in precluding criminal 
responsibility in some factual situations, they fail to adequately address others.  
Accordingly, they do not provide a comprehensive basis for recognising as lawful 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that are otherwise 
permitted by law.  One example is the argument that life-sustaining treatment will not 
always be a necessary of life.  If the analysis set out earlier is correct, this argument 
would be effective in removing criminal responsibility for treatment that is regarded 
as futile. It would not, however, address the issue of liability where there is a refusal 
by a competent adult of medical treatment that might be regarded as being in his or 
her best interests. 
 
The second problem is that even if an argument might potentially provide a solution 
capable of universal application, whether that argument would be accepted is 
uncertain (and indeed, a few of those arguments are best described as tenuous).  For 
example, it is suggested that the most plausible ‘universal’ argument is that there will 
be no criminal responsibility for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
because no duty arises to provide treatment that has been refused.  However, such a 
                                                 
112 Sometimes resolution of this issue is sought by way of declaration (for example Brightwater Care 
Group v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 and Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 235), 
but it can also arise as part of the court’s deliberation as to whether to consent to, or authorise, 
withholding or withdrawing the treatment.  Although in a different context, this was the approach taken 
by Chesterman J in State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 on the basis that it could not be in 
a person’s best interests to be subjected to an unlawful act: 456. See also State of Queensland v B 
[2008] 2 Qd R 562, 565 (Wilson J). 
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conclusion is far from certain as it depends on reasoning that is arguably 
impermissible when construing a Code. 
 
Although it is accepted that the imposition of criminal sanctions is unlikely to occur in 
relation to these decisions (the authors are unaware of a successful prosecution of this 
type in Queensland), it is undesirable that the criminal law be left in such a state.  
Doctors and others should not be left in doubt as to their obligations under the 
criminal law, particularly when taking part in what is considered to be an established 
part of medical practice.  Accordingly, it is submitted that reform is required to 
address the problems that the law is either incomplete in its approach to this issue or 
uncertain. 
 
The solution adopted in Western Australia was to pass the Acts Amendment (Consent 
to Medical Treatment) Act 2008 (WA), which amended the Criminal Code (WA) to 
add section 259(2): 
 
A person is not criminally responsible for not administering or ceasing to administer, in good 
faith and with reasonable care and skill, surgical or medical treatment (including palliative care) 
if not administering or ceasing to administer the treatment is reasonable, having regard to the 
patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case. 
 
In Rossiter,113 Martin CJ held that section 259(2) would provide the facility caring for 
Mr Rossiter with an excuse in the circumstances of that case.  In applying the wording 
of the provision, His Honour considered that the phrase ‘all the circumstances of the 
case’ was broad enough to include a competent refusal of treatment, and that it was 
‘reasonable’ to act in accordance with that refusal.114  While such an approach to 
construing that provision is logical and the outcome in Rossiter in this regard is 
sensible, it is suggested that any reform in Queensland should be more explicit as to 
the role of refusing treatment.  Even if the Queensland Supreme Court interpreted a 
corresponding provision in the same way as Rossiter, it is suggested that it is 
preferable for doctors and others not have to rely on the provision being construed in 
that way.   
 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the Criminal Code (Qld) be amended to provide that 
criminal responsibility will not arise for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment where that treatment has been refused by a competent adult.  Further 
amendment should also make clear that there is no liability where the withholding or 
withdrawal of such treatment has been consented to in accordance with the 
guardianship legislation, or where such a decision has been consented to, or 
authorised, by the Supreme Court in its parens patriae jurisdiction.  Such an 
amendment could be inserted into section 282 of the Criminal Code (Qld), which is 
the analogous provision to Western Australia’s section 259. 
                                                 
113 [2009] WASC 229.  
114 Ibid [44]. 
